This article analyzes engagement with Russias Compatriot policy, as an example of ethnizenship-type of quasi-citizenship, in Crimea, as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement. The article focuses on unpacking the lived experience of Compatriot identification and engagement and the rationale for this engagement. The article finds a narrow and niche engagement with the Compatriot policy in Crimea where only the most politicized and discriminated individuals, alongside beneficiaries of the Compatriot policy, identify as Compatriots. However, the article also finds dissatisfaction with the Compatriot policy because it fails to offer the kind of status, and rights and benefits, of full citizenship. Thus, while citizenship might be becoming fractured, via quasi-citizenship policies, citizenship remains the key point of entry to the kin-state. Focusing on the lived experience of quasi-citizenship, and examining quasi-citizenship as a category of practice, is crucial for developing understanding of the social and political impacts of quasi-citizenship policies.
Introduction
There has been a recent proliferation of quasi-citizenship policies by states (Table 1) in particular among kin-states (the focus of this article) which offer partial, but not full citizenship, rights and benefits to external co-ethnic communities. As Deets argues, quasi-citizenship policies are fuzzy and not full citizenship, and offer a documented relationship and certain benefits (scholarships, preferential treatment, cultural support) (Deets 2008, 196; Groenendijk 2006; Grigas 2016) . How-been migration-centered. The article focuses also on important differences, which demonstrate the importance of understanding engagement with, and implications of ethnizenship, alongside migration-centered analyses. The trans-nationalization of citizenship for migrants might be a policy of inclusion, and demonstrate the trans-nationalization of the nation-state (Schiller and Fouron 1999; Laguerre 1999; Fox 2005, 172) . By contrast, kin-state policies of ethnizenship demonstrate the transnationalization of nationalism, pursed by kin-states across borders (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011 ).
Yet, as this article shows, kin-state policies are intersected with, and contested by, preferences of expressing (or not) desire to engage with kin-state policies. The article finds that the desire to engage with kin-state quasi-citizenship is skewed towards those a) identifying most vociferously with the kin-state and b) benefiting from existing kin-state policies and networks. Overall, this analysis of quasi-citizenship as a category of practice shows how citizenship, as an institution, may not be becoming fragmented (c.f. Turner 2001) because, for ordinary people, it remains the main point of entry to the state.
Russia's Compatriot Policy as a Quasi-Citizenship Policy This article analyzes Russias Compatriot policy as a quasi-citizenship policy, and more specifically as a form of ethnizenship, which formalizes and legitimizes relations between Russia and those Russia claim as compatriots (sootechestvenniki). The Compatriot policy offers some rights and benefits (such as facilitated migration) to those considered compatriots, without offering full citizenship. Reaching out to compatriots was initiated (under President Yeltsin, 1994) by Russias government, and a Duma Committee to foster relations with compatriots (Shevel 2011a, 87) . The first legislation relating to Compatriots was passed in 1999, with several updates since, modifying though not simplifying the concept and policies provided for Compatriots, described below. Since 2002, under Putins tutelage, Russia engaged more with Compatriots, increasing the number of policies (such as resettlement) and organizations set up to engage with compatriots across states with Russian populations both within and beyond the post-Soviet space (see Byford 2012) . Conceptually, others have described the Compatriot policy as a citizenship policy (Smith 1999a; Grigas 2012 ). However, this article conceptualizes the Compatriot as a form of quasi-citizenship, specifically ethnizenship (after Baubock 2006). The Compatriot policy does not facilitate citizenship rights, i.e. the acquisition of Russian citizenship, and does not grant Compatriots equal legal status or rights (e.g. enfranchisement) as Russian citizens. Rather the Compatriot policy offers a form of quasi-citizenship for non-resident kin communities, what Shaw and tiks (2012, 321) describe as external quasi-citizenship. Baubck (2006) contrasts ethnizenship to denizenship, a form of internal quasi-citizenship for resident non-citizen immigrants (Shaw and tiks 2012, 321) , and multi-level citizenship, a plural within-state form of quasi-citizenship (e.g. a form or informal status within federal sub-units), such a Kosovo vis--vis Yugoslavia (Krasniqi 2012) and Quebec vis--vis Canada (Balthazar 1995) .
Thus, it is important analytically, and legally, to conceptualize the Compatriot policy as type of quasi-citizenship, rather than a form of citizenship, as well as to disentangle what sort of quasi- Table 2 ). For example, there are significant differences between ethnizenship and the deficient policy of denizenship (Schlenker and Blatter 2014, 1099) . Denizenship deliberately fails to offer full citizenship and, therefore, denies non-citizen residents political self-determination and effective participation while satisfying socio-economic concerns (Schlenker and Blatter 2014, 1099) . By contrast, ethnizenship is about the inclusion, in terms of rights, benefits and status, of external non-resident ethnicized communities, such as Russias Compatriots and Hungarys diaspora.
Ethnizenship, as a topic of analysis, is also distinct from diaspora engagement and transnationalism, both as an institution and status of membership, and as a relationship of belonging between individual and the state of residence and state of origin. Variously, these works have considered the precise transnational social fields inhabited by these individuals between and across states and nations (Schiller and Fouron 1999; Laguerre 1999; Fox 2005, 172) ; the impact of this transnationalism on nationalism, hybrid national identity and belonging (Varadarajan 2010; Naujoks 2010; Tllyan 1996; Hall 1990) ; and the rationalities of engagement for governing (Dlano and Gamlen 2014; Gamlen 2006 ) and home-state development (Sinatti and Horst 2015) . What unifies this research is precisely its focus on immigrantstransmigrants according to Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc (2005) where diaspora are created via the movement of people across borders (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999) , such as via political exile or labour migration, and with it the disruption the ideas of home and abroad (Varadarajan 2010, 34) .
While states in post-communist space may be sources of emigration, to Western Europe and North America, domestically it is border changes that have led to cross-border transnational ties, between kin-states and external co-ethnic communities, as a region of high border flux (King and Melvin 2000; Brubaker and Kim 2011) . For example, the Soviet Union created a beached (Laitin 1998) and accidental diaspora (Brubaker 2000) of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers across post-Soviet space. However, the diaspora claimed by Russia of up to 25 million people, is far from singular in terms of identity and experiences (Kolst 1996) . For example, there is a contested notion of homeland between territory of the Soviet Union and present-day Russia, if this can be conceived as a homeland at all (Laitin 1995) . For post-Soviet Russians, concepts of home and abroad are even more contested than for transmigrants, who at least might have a more fixed idea of where they or their descendants have come from and where they presently reside. Moreover, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers form of a spectrum of experiences: from being hosted in states such as Estonia and Latvia (and their rights to citizenship restricted), to being local majorities in territories such as Crimea, and regions of Kazakhstan.
This articles concern is, with quasi-citizenship policies where the individuals engaging with such policies do not, and largely have not, resided within the state providing such policies (i.e. ethnizenship). Such quasi-citizenship policies have, like policies of diaspora engagement more broadly (Waterbury 2010; Dlano and Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014) , become particularly popular in recent years. For many kin-states, such policies are a useful way to engage with external co-ethnic communities which reside in states that prohibit dual citizenship (Ho, Hickey, and Yeoh 2015, 154; Waterbury 2009 ), such as Ukraine (Shevel 2011b).
Conceptually, it might be useful to conceive of diaspora as including both those created via moving people and moving borders (Baubck 2010) . However this article argues that, theoretically, in terms of analyzing engagement with quasi-citizenship policies, it is necessary to distinguish between ethnizenship and denizenship (Baubck 2006) , and to study quasi-citizenship as a category of practice, i.e. in terms of how it is practiced and experience by those eligible.
The policies can often be similar, if not the same, instruments of engagement, where Russian migrants in Western Europe and North America are conceived as Compatriots (Byford 2012) , just as those beached within post-Soviet space are. However, the implications are different: whereas citizenship and denizenship for transmigrants might be instruments of inclusion, at home and abroad, ethnizenship for co-ethnic communities is part of a kin-state goal of extra-territorial nationbuilding (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011) , i.e. advancing transnationalism for nationalist goals, as opposed to transnationalising the state (Laguerre 1999) .
Who are Compatriots?
Russias definition of who is a Compatriot is fuzzy and deliberately open to multiple interpretations to provide the policy with a degree of flexibility. Russia has a very loose concept of compatriots due to an amorphous conglomerate that the policy refers to, including former Soviet citizens speaking Russian and retaining some emotional links to Russia (Kosmarskaya 2011, 60) . Shevel (2009, 4; 2011b, 179) , argues this definitional vagueness is deliberate and allows Russia flexibility to modify over time who qualifies, without requiring a change of legislation. As Laruelle (2015b, 8) argues, the Compatriot concept is deliberately fluid and wide reaching. The concept stretches from a civic core of expatriate citizens, to a broader group of people who are culturally and spiritually oriented toward Russia but avoids an ethnic or linguistic definition of ethnic Russians and, lastly, to the former citizens category, including the Soviet peoples and descendants of those from the Czarist Empire. This broad categorization ensures, as Putin has argued, that the Compatriot concept is conceived not in legal terms but as something voluntaristic: of personal choice. Of selfdetermination. I would even say, of spiritual self-determination (President of Russia 2001). In other words, to be a Compatriot is not only a question of being Russian but of choosing to demonstrate this identity, and affiliation to Russia, by identifying and engaging with Russia as a Compatriot. As this article will address, it is an interesting question to consider who chooses to identify as a Compatriot, and, therefore, to consider the Compatriot policy as a category of practice.
The breadth of who Russia considers a Compatriot does not undermine its conceptualization as an ethnizenship-type of quasi-citizenship. Rather, it signifies Russias desire to expand the Compatriot concept beyond an ethnic-linguistic core, i.e. of identify and/or speaking Russian, and to (seemingly) de-ethnicize what it means to be a Compatriot. This is a common feature of how kinstates define eligibility for kin-state policies. However, analytically, it is still possible to argue that Russia is seeking to advance extra-territorial rights and benefits (i.e. quasi-citizenship) based on such an ethnicized, and nostalgic, view of whom the Russian state should be concerned. Empirically too, with Russias annexation of Crimea, we can trace how in securitizing the Compatriot policy, Russia also played on an essentially ethnic and/or linguistic nationalism by arguing for a need to support, and act aggressively to defend, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea, and Ukraine more widely (Laruelle 2015a, 95) . It is worth noting also, that Russia simplified the procedure for Compatriots in April 2014, after annexing Crimea, so that Compatriots can now acquire Russian citizenship within three months provided they will permanently reside in Russia and denounce citizenship from other states (Rossiiskaia Gazeta 2014; Grigas 2016) . Again, this demonstrates the utility of having a flexible definitional approach to Compatriots and the policies offered to Compatriots.
The Compatriot Policy: Categories of Analysis vs. Practice
Previous studies of the Compatriot policy have focused on top-down analysis, focusing on the Compatriot policy as an institution and category of analysis. Here, scholars are divided between those who argue the Compatriot policy is passive (Zevelev 2008; Rutland 2010) and those who argue for the soft power and soft propaganda potential of the Compatriot policies (Nozhenko 2006; Conley and Gerber 2011) . This rift extends between those criticizing the policy, arguing it promotes Russias soft, and even hard, power interests, and those who downplay the strength of Russias approach. Rutland argues the Compatriot policy is a policy of passivity, with Russia more concerned about advancing Russian states interests (military and economic) rather than on protecting the rights of co-ethnics in the near abroad (Rutland 2010, 131-2) . Similarly, Zevelev (2008, 49, 54) argues that while the policy offers a tough rhetoric, in practice it is a very modest and moderate in content policy. This is consistent with empirical analysis of the Compatriot policy, which demonstrates the failure of the resettlement policy to Russia. This is explained by Russias self-interested demo. . . concerns, which have guided the resettlement policy explicitly to lure compatriots into depressed and depopulated regions of Russia, without offering much to compensate for all the disadvantages of such a venture (Kosmarskaya 2011, 65; Byford 2012; Jarzyska 2012) . Waterbury (2009, 159) argues, therefore, that Russia failed to offer Compatriots incentives for resettlement which, in turn, resulted in few wishing to relocate.
On the critical side are those who pathologize the soft power potential of Russias compatriot approach (Nozhenko 2006; Conley and Gerber 2011) . They argue Russia is increasing its claims on compatriots, culturally, and via financial and organizational support which buffers Kremlin-friendly networks of influence in post-Soviet space with the goal of entrenching loyal interests groups [. . . ] through financing and valuable connections and contracts (Grigas 2012, 9) . Conley and Gerber (2011, 12) argue Russia has pursued soft propaganda, using the compatriot policy to educate compatriots on history and politics according Russias interpretation. Russian policy reflects this view, with politicians like Lavrov and Russias foreign policy documents discussing Russias new soft power approach designed at influencing compatriots according to Russias values (Shestakov 2008 ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2007). This shows a more coercive approach to soft power than Nye conceived, as a kind of co-optive power (Nye 1990, 166-7; 2004, x) . As Kiseleva (2015, 326) argues, it also demonstrates how Russia has a faulty perception of soft power by mirroring purportedly insidious and manipulative Western soft power. Russian soft power therefore tries to promote Kremlin-influence within the grassroots of post-Soviet society, and beyond, via the Compatriot policy. Since annexation, scholars such as Grigas (2016, 92) , have hardened further their analysis of Russias Compatriot policy, beyond a policy of coercion, conceiving of the Compatriot policy as an imperial and territorially expansionist strategy propagated by Russia.
These perspectives demonstrate the variation in how the implications of the Compatriot Policy have been conceived previously, whether passive, persuasive or coercive. These perspectives also focus on the Compatriot policy as an institution and category of analysis. By contrast, there has been little analysis of how Compatriot policies actually work on the ground, of whether individuals engage and identify with the Compatriot policy, i.e. as a category of practice. If the Compatriot policy tries to wield soft power, to engage people and societies, rather than governments and elites (Tsygankov 2006 (Tsygankov , 1081 , then it is important to consider the agency of these people. Thus, this article shifts focus to analyzing the Compatriot policy in terms of 1) who engages as a Compatriot and with the Compatriot policy, and 2) why, to improve understanding of the Compatriot policy as a category of analysis by examining it as a category of practice.
Crimea as a Case of Compatriot Engagement
In trying to unpack Compatriot engagement, on the one hand, Crimea might be conceived as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement in post-Soviet space (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013, 924; Kuzio 2008; Hedenskog 2008) . Crimea, at the point of data collection (2012) (2013) , was a Russian ethnic enclave within Ukraine which has been the site of pro-Russian, pro-Russia ethnic parties and separatist movements, notably in 1994, at the height of separatist sentiment (see Sasse 2007) . These pro-Russian ethnic parties (Russkoe Edinstvo/Russian Unity, hereafter RE) and their cultural affiliates (Russkaia Obshchina Kryma/Russian Community of Crimea, hereafter ROC) were themselves part of the Compatriot policy as Compatriot organizations. Crimea was also assumed to be a region of Russian passportization, like the de facto states of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, with estimates of 6,000 to 100,000 of Crimean residents holding Russian passports, i.e. 0.25-4-of Crimean residents (Kuzio 2008; Hedenskog 2008, 35) . This context, therefore, could portray Crimea as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement. This is amplified, potentially, by Crimeas de facto annexation by Russia in March 2014 which saw the securitization of the Compatriot policy (Grigas 2016; Wanner 2014) , with Putin arguing for the need to defend Compatriots in Ukraine from threats and discrimination (President of Russia 2014). The point of this paper is not to consider so much post-fieldwork events but rather to consider how far Crimea was a region of Compatriot engagement, and how far the ideas that became viral at the point of Crimeas annexation, e.g. of necessity to protect discriminated Russian Compatriots in Crimea, resonated before Crimeas annexation of 2014.
However, this framing of Crimea as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement is confounded by analyzing the specifics of Compatriot policy within Crimea. While statistics on resettlement from Crimea are hard to obtain, scholarship quotas provide insight on general provision through the Compatriot policy to Compatriots across post-Soviet space. These figures demonstrate, at least in terms of scholarships, how few places were allocated for Crimea in comparison to other postSoviet states and de facto states. They also demonstrate how Crimea was considered separately to the rest of Ukraine, in terms of provision. Yet in terms of absolute provision (Figure 1) where Crimea received the fewest scholarship places, while relatively, (Figure 2 ), the biggest beneficiaries were those residing in the relatively small de facto state cases (e.g. South Ossetia, Transnistria, Abkhazia). Overall, this paints an interesting picture of a case considered separately from its parent state (Ukraine), deserving of its own provision, and yet falling behind provision of most other post-Soviet states and de facto states.
How the Compatriot policy functioned on the ground in Crimea, in the period preceding Crimeas de facto annexation by Russia in 2014 is therefore a fertile subject providing several complex issues to be entangled. This section outlines existing approaches to kin-state relations and institutions, to demonstrate a gap in existing research, which has focused on theoretical or institutional perspectives, leaving aside the engagement of individuals with these quasi-citizenship policies as a category of practice.
Studying Quasi-Citizenship as a Category of Practice
Before moving to the articles empirical analysis, this section discusses the articles methodology and methods of data collection and analysis. Increasingly, within citizenship studies, there is an appreciation of the need to study not only the institution of citizenship but also the experiences, meanings and practices of citizenship (Leuchter 2014, 777; Isin and Turner 2007, 1-2) . This empirical approach, although still emerging, has been conceived as appropriate within the practices of (2010) dual and multiple citizenship, to unpack how individuals experience and negotiate their multiple citizenship statuses. This perspective also has important implications on broader questions such as peoples ability to act with and against the state, and attempting to understand their actions and their identity as citizens [. . . ] to unravel and reappraise the complex ties and ongoing negotiations between citizenship, state and nationality today (Leuchter 2014, 779) . Similarly, Vasiljevi (2014, 3, 10) analyzes citizenship, as a kin-state practice, from the perspective of its identity-forming and recognition-bearing social role of citizenship acquisition policies from the perspective of how they are experienced.
However, these studies focus on dual citizenship experiences, and leave aside understanding, and unpacking, experiences of quasi-citizenship, as a fuzzier form of citizenship. Thus, methodologically, this article applies the same approach of studying citizenship from the bottom-up, and as a category of practice to quasi-citizenship. Overall, this article hopes to prompt more research in to the meanings and practices of ethnizenship, and quasi-citizenship more generally, to use analysis of quasi-citizenship as a category of practice to inform understanding of these fuzzier and increasingly common forms of citizenship as a category of analysis.
Methodology: A Meanings and Practices Approach to Analyzing

Quasi-Citizenship
Consistent with an agency-centered perspective, this article applies the everyday nationalism approach to analyze citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices from the bottom-up. This everyday nationalism approach examines the lay categories of everyday social experience (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4) , by unpacking everyday categories of practice as opposed to top-down categories of analysis to understand how people enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied contexts of their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 537; Brubaker et al. 2006 ).
To operationalize the everyday nationalism approach, I conducted 53 semi-structured interviews in Crimea with everyday actors (2012) (2013) . I combined this everyday nationalism approach with an interpretive ontology, to gain experience-near/emic understandings of identities, institutions and concepts (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012; Geertz 1975) , as opposed to deductive, top-down or experience-far concepts. The interviews tried to engage with respondents experiences of these citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices, in terms of their experiences of using these practices, their motivations underpinning these practices and personal impacts of these practices. Analytically, the article analyses the association between identification with the kin-state and engagement with kin-state practices.
The design of the article is not purely inductive (nor is it positivist and deductive). Rather, building on the interpretivism, the article is iterativecombining inductive and deductive logicsby bringing together and moving between a set of observations and a theoretical generalization (Tavory and Timmermans 2014, 4 ; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), as well as a recognition of the role of theory at all stages of the research, including before field research (Burawoy 2009, 9) . The article, therefore, does not set out a formal hypothesis, concerning the relationship between identification and engagement but, rather, a starting assumption assumption that those who identify more strongly co-ethnically (i.e. as Russian) and with the kin-state (i.e. with Russia) will be more likely to engage with kin-state practices which, iteratively, will be refined in line with the empirical evidence analyzed from below.
In selecting respondents, the aim was not for a representative sample (Small 2009 ). Rather, the aim was for an in-depth study of a broad range of respondents to seek out multiple perspectives and contradictory narratives by interviewing across the political spectrum (e.g. across the youth wings of political parties) as well as with organizations and individually that were not directly politically active (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 51). Interviews were primarily conducted in Simferopol, the administrative capitol of the Autonomous Region of Crimea, Ukraine (as was its status when fieldwork was conducted in 2012 and 2013).
Unpacking Quasi-Citizenship Practices in Crimea
To examine the relationship between identification/belonging and engagement with kin-state practices, this article uses identification categories derived from interview data:
1. Discriminated Russians (n=9) emphasized not just a strong Russian identification but also how they felt threatened by the Ukrainian state 2. Ethnic Russians (n=18) identified primarily as Russian but this was expressed without feeling discriminated 3. Political Ukrainians (n=15) identified primarily as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic identification 4. Crimeans (n=5) identified primarily regionally and inter-ethnically, identifying as between Ukrainian and Russians
Ethnic Ukrainians (n=6) identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian
These categories were inductively derived as a tool to conceptualize respondents' co-ethnic identification and identification with the kin-state, showing kin majorities to be internally fractured in terms of these dimensions. These inductive categories are used in this article to structure the analysis of practices. Drawing together respondents who identified in similar ways, vis--vis Crimea, Ukraine and Russia, the categories are used to examine how those within the different categories engaged with citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices similarly or differently. In turn, this allows the article to analyze the extent of a relationship between co-ethnic identification and kin-state practices. This approach also allows for a more structured and rigorous cross-case comparison. When discussing each categorys practices, there will be a brief explanation also of how each category identified. These inductive categories provide a way to analyze the spectrum of interview respondents, as opposed to cherry picking particular behaviors and attitudes within the respondents, and a way to examine the potential for, or not, a relationship between meanings and practices, by seeing how different identification categories engage, or not, and why in different Russian practices.
This section analyzes quasi-citizenship practices, i.e. the exercise of partial but not full citizenship rights and benefits, by analyzing respondents engagement with Russias Compatriot policy and citizenship policy. The section focuses on two elements to analyze these Compatriot practices:
1. Identification as a Compatriot, and 2. Engagement with specific Compatriot rights and benefits.
In terms of identification, the section addresses how the loose and deliberately ambiguous but equally communitarian logic of protecting the collective rights of Compatriots (sootechestvenniki ) is reflected by engagement with the Compatriot policy as a kin-state practice (Kosmarskaya 2011, 60; Shevel 2009; Smith 1999b) . Thus, the section analyzes whether respondents conceived of themselves as Compatriots, the basis of this identification, e.g. nostalgia for Soviet Union and/or common language and culture and the implications of engagement.
Discriminated Russians
Discriminated Russians identified most strongly as Russian, and with Russia, and combined this with identifying as the victims of what they pathologized as Ukraines policies of Ukrainization. Although ethnic Russians were the majority group in Crimea, Discriminated Russians felt marginalized within the peninsula, and even more so within Ukraine. Although other categories identified ethnically as Russian (e.g. Ethnic Russians), Discriminated Russians were the only to combine this identification with this sense of marginalization, in contrast to Ethnic Russians who resisted the idea of feeling, and being, discriminated, within Crimea and Ukraine more widely.
Organizationally, Discriminated Russians were the only category who actively participated in pro-Russian organizations in Crimea, such as RE and ROC, the same organizations whose leaders Sergei Aksenov (RE) and Sergei Tsekov (ROC) would be instrumental in Crimeas annexation by Russia in 2014.
Interestingly, Discriminated Russians were the only respondents (excluding a few Ethnic Russians and Crimeans) who identified as Compatriots and were interested in the Compatriot policy. In part, this was because they did not identify with the Ukrainian state, being left sort of abroad from their homeland after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, on this basis, we are their [Russias] Compatriots [C-48a, C-48b, C-46] . Their identification as Compatriots was therefore tied to their sense of nostalgia and loss vis-a-vis Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as their loss of status vis-a-vis Ukraine. Hence, they felt the Compatriot policy was certainly necessary because of the infringement of my rights to speak Russian whereas Russias compatriots should live with dignity in any country of the world [C-25, C-46] . However, Discriminated Russians were dissatisfied with the Compatriot policy. Discriminated Russians did appreciate that Russia does not forget about our compatriots, yet they wanted to see Russia "ng more active steps to actually help them [C-19a, C-25, C-24] . They were disappointed by what the Compatriot Policy offered (resettlement) while it failed to offer citizenship rights [C48a, C-48b, C-46] . They maligned Compatriot resettlement because they wanted to stay in sunny Crimea, their homeland where they had roots, rather than move to snowy Siberia [C-48b, C-19a, C-48a, C-55, C-24, C-46] . Instead of facilitating their exit from Crimea, they wanted Russia to require changes within Ukraine that would improve their situation in Crimea.
It is likely, therefore, that Discriminated Russians would never have been satisfied with a Compatriot policy that fell short of offering full citizenship rights, but which, at the same time, was prohibited by Ukrainian law.
Ethnic Russians
Ethnic Russians identified as Russian. However, they were limited in their identification with Russia as a state, stemming from their critique of how Russia was governed. In this sense, they neither saw themselves as patriots of Putin, nor wanted their Russian ethnic identification to be elided with support of Russia, given their identification with Ukraine as their legitimate state. Secondly, Ethnic Russians did not accompany their ethnic identification as Russian with sentiments of discrimination (as Discriminated Russians).
In terms of practicing quasi-citizenship, Ethnic Russians were more divided compared to Discriminated Russians. They were split between:
1. A few who identified as Compatriots, and had positive associations, 2. A few who identified as Compatriots but had negative associations with the Russian state, and 3. Most who did not, and had no interest to, identify as Compatriots.
In the first group, few respondents identified as Russian Compatriots and believed that Russia should offer support to them [C-34, C-9, C-53]. They identified as Compatriots because of their symbolic identification, as Russian (russkii), and their cultural and spiritual closeness to Russia and/or Moscow, as somewhere they felt they had a personal relationship with, because it was part of my identity [C-9, C-53, C-34]. The second group did not understand Russias official conception of what it meant to be a Compatriot. They identified an interpersonal kinship with their native people in Russia but this sense of closeness remained at the level of the household and did not extent to the state, because of how Russia governed, and especially because of Putin [C-22, C-51]. They identified as Compatriots of Russian people, but not as Compatriots of the Russian state. However most Ethnic Russians, the third group, did not identify as Russian Compatriots [C-57b, C-7, C-1]. They were apathetic, if not negative, about these practices believing they were not effective but rather an excuse for Russia to engage with Russians abroad [C-3, C-8].
While divided in whether they identified as Compatriots, Ethnic Russians were unified in their antipathy towards what the Compatriot policy offered. As Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians were not interested in resettlement because, as a Russian enclave it was not necessary to leave Crimea where they lived freely [C-53, C-51, C-34]. Secondly, they criticized Russia's uncomfortable and under-developed regions, such as Tuva (southern Siberia), that Russia promoted for resettlement [C-51] . Instead, they wanted to remain in Crimea where it was warm, or migrate what they believed were better locations, such as the UK [C-33, C-51 C-53]. Hence their hypothetical choice of emigration destinations was not motivated by linguistic or cultural closeness, but rather by material understandings of where would further personal development and opportunities.
Political Ukrainians
Political Ukrainians identified themselves as primarily Ukrainian citizens because it was their place of birth. They resisted the ethnicized identification of Discriminated Russians and Ethnic Russians, resisting identifying as ethnically Russian, or ethnically at all, preferring to identify with Ukraine in a political sense as citizens of Ukraine. Political Ukrainians often distinguished themselves from their parents, who they identified as ethnically Russian, because of their post-Soviet socialization, which made it possible to be from Crimea and politically Ukrainian (even if their parents were not ethnically Ukrainian).
Political Ukrainians were more unified than Ethnic Russians in their apathy towards the Compatriot policy. Few had heard of Russias policy [e.g. C-32, C-37, C-11a, C-11b, C-12, C-29, C-18, C-47, C-31, C-23] and none identified themselves as Compatriots. Rather they identified as compatriots of each other and were confused why Russia would consider them compatriots (of Russia) [C-11a, C-11b, C-31] . This lack of self-identification as being a Compatriot contributed to their sense of confusion about what the purpose of the policy was [C-11a, C-11b] and who Russia considered to be Compatriots, whether you had to have both passports, Russian and Ukrainian [C-18] or whether you had to have relatives from Russia [C-30] . Beyond this lack of identification with the policy, they maligned what the policy offered, as not promis[ing] good things and not being used very widely by people from Crimea because it did not offer the ability to live in Moscow, which was where those who wanted to move to Russia wanted primarily to live [C-18, C-59] .
The exception was C-28 who, as a beneficiary of the Compatriot policy receiving a Russian scholarship, saw Compatriot practices as cool" (kruto) and very great" (ochen klassno). She was grateful for the material benefits it provided, namely access to better opportunities in Russia compared to Crimea/Ukraine. Overall, it was significant that the only Political Ukrainian who reflected positively on Compatriot practices was a material beneficiary of Russian opportunities.
Crimeans
Crimeans identified inter-ethnically and regionally, because they identified themselves as having both Ukrainian and Russian parents, and identified, geographically, Crimea as being between Ukraine and Russia. Thus, Crimeans emphasized their personal, familial and geographical hybridity, as opposed to aligning with a particular singular identity, as Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians did.
Crimeans, as most Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, had little knowledge and interest in Russias Compatriot Policy and did not identify as Compatriots [C-36, C-4, C-57a] . Only C2a described Compatriots as those whose parents and/or grandparents were born in the former territory of the USSR; however, she did not identify herself within this framework [C-2a] .
Most Crimeans did not connect Russias policy of resettlement to the Compatriot Policy, and, as previous categories, were uninterested in resettlement because no one will go to the hinterland to live -4, C-2a, C-57a] . Rather, if they did ever move to Russia, it would not be where Russia wanted them to move, but to live where they had familial connections [C-2a] , demonstrating the importance of interpersonal connections over state-sponsored programs. Others oriented themselves away from Russia explaining that they were more likely to want to visit, or move to elsewhere in Ukraine such as Kyiv and Lviv, as places to which they felt closer [C-36] .
Ethnic Ukrainians
Ethnic Ukrainians resided in Crimea but had been born outside the peninsula, and identified their native language as Ukrainian and themselves as ethnically Ukrainian. They identified as ethnically Ukrainian because they had been born outside of Crimea, unlike Political Ukrainians who conceived that it was now possible, for the post-Soviet generation, to identify (politically) with Ukraine and be from Crimea.
Ethnic Ukrainians did not identify as Compatriots. As previous categories, Ethnic Ukrainians criticized Compatriot resettlement. They argued that at least in Crimea, very few people [. . . ] use the Compatriot policy because it was only concerned, from their perspective, with resettlement to remote areas (okrainy) of Russia [. . . ] where no one from Sevastopol, from Crimea wants to go [C-26, C-45, C-49] . Here they alluded to the rift between the proposed recipients of the policy, for whom resettlement did not appeal, and the Russian state, who were motivated to try to solve its very bad demographic situation and erosion of the Slavic population, by trying to restock the population via resettlement of Compatriots [C-26] .
Overall, only Discriminated Russians identified as Compatriots, framing the Compatriot policy as necessary to protect them from discrimination by Ukraine. Beyond this, one Political Ukrainian, as a beneficiary of the Compatriot policy, and several Ethnic Russians identified as Compatriots wanting to either feel more spiritually close to Russia, or seeing the Russian people, but not the Russian state, as their compatriots; however, this did not contest their political affiliation to Ukraine.
In contrast, the majority of respondents (Ethnic Russians, Crimeans, Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians), did not identify as Compatriots. They showed a lack of understanding and interest in what the policy offered (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians, Crimeans), and even pathologized these practices, given their links to corrupt pro-Russian organizations (some Ethnic Russians, Ethnic Ukrainians). Thus, respondents identification did not determine their identification as Compatriots. Rather, it was only those who directly benefited from Compatriot practices (in terms of being a scholarship recipient or employee) who were engaged and interested in these practices.
Interestingly, even if there was differentiation in which categories did and did not identify as Compatriots, all categories were dissatisfied with Compatriot practices. For Discriminated Russians, Compatriot practices did not going far enough in offering rights they sought (full citizenship rights), or in protecting their interests, given their perception of discrimination vis--vis Ukraine. Hence, the policy of resettlement was not attractive to any respondents, and even failed to be connected as a Compatriot practice by Crimeans, because it offered neither an attractive climate (Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians), nor economic opportunities (Ethnic Ukrainians). Rather if respondents wanted to leave Crimea, it would be to places of their choosing, such as where they had relatives (Crimeans), to elsewhere in Ukraine (Crimeans) or to Western Europe (Ethnic Russians).
Conclusion: Compatriot Policy as a form of Quasi-Citizenship
Overall, this article finds that, while Crimea might be conceived as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement, the analyzing the Compatriot policy as a category of practice shows the policy to be more complex. Firstly, there was actually a narrow engagement with the Compatriot policy in Crimea. Only Discriminated Russians and some beneficiaries of the policy identified as Compatriots of the Russian Federation. Secondly, among those who identified as Compatriots, few were content with what the Compatriot policy offered, i.e. quasi-citizenship rights. Rather Discriminated Russians preferred, and were lobbying for, citizenship, because it would provide a superior status and set of rights and benefits vis--vis Russia and Ukraine. The quasi-citizenship Compatriot policy provided rights and benefits that were seen as undesirable and insignificant (e.g. the right to resettle in Russias okrayni (periphery), even for those who wanted interaction with Russia (Discriminated Russians). Most respondents were uninterested in becoming informed about how to access these rights, given that access to these rights was restricted to Russian Compatriot networks, while those who were informed and had access, via these organizations, used these organizations to lobby Russia for what they wanted (citizenship).
It is ironic, therefore, that in 2014 it was Russia which securitized the Compatriot policy by legitimizing Russias intervention and annexation of Crimea as an act legitimized by a kinstate who claimed it had a moral obligation to protect Compatriots (sootechestvenniki) in Crimea (Wanner 2014, 428) . As Wanner (2014, 430) argues, this indicates a Russian political logic in which compatriots in Crimea were easily identifiable, and indeed, that they identified themselves as compatriots, and wanted engagement with Russia as compatriots. This article has shown the extent to which Compatriot practices were an interest and undertaking of a specific (minority) community within Crimea, concerning those who were involved in pro-Russian organizations (ROC, RE) who imbued an ideology of discrimination buttressed by their membership in these organizations and identification as Compatriots. However, as this article has shown, even these niche supporters felt dissatisfied by what Russia, in 2012 and 2013, was willing to offer: namely quasi-citizenship and not full citizenship.
Following bottom-up migration-centered analysis of transnational citizenship, this article focuses on lived experience of quasi-citizenship to analyze engagement with the Compatriot policy as a category of practice. Distinguishing between these forms of quasi-citizenship is important given the differing implications of quasi-citizenship for resident non-citizens (i.e. denizens) and nonresident co-ethnic communities, in particular for advancing a policy of transnationalism with a nationalist end, via extra-territorial nation-building (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011) , as opposed to transnationalising the state (Laguerre 1999) .
Theoretically, the article demonstrates how far there is variation within engagement with ethnizenship, associated with identity but also with organizational ties as well as the preference, among the most pro-Russian respondents for more than ethnizenship. Ethnizenship, then, is not a uniformly desirable practice, but affected by respondents willingness to participate in extra-territorial process of nation-building.
Quasi-citizenship, at least in the form of ethnizenship discussed in this article, lacks the ability to offer real and desirable political, social rights and benefits. In particular, ethnizenship does not offer rights which are not in situ within the home-state, but rather offers rights within the kin-state, such as facilitated migration rights. This assumes that kin communities want to migrate to the kin-state, as opposed to increase their opportunities and leverage within the home-state. As Waterbury (2014) argues, in Hungary the introduction of non-resident citizenship became potentially more meaningful once it was attached to real political rights in Hungary, as well as strengthening ethnic Hungarians position vis--vis their home-state. This finding speaks to the parallel migration-centered literature by demonstrating the significance of citizenship, as opposed to weaker alternatives. Moreover even when citizenship, as social and political institution, is theorized as being eroded and becoming fragmented by quasi-citizenship (Turner 2001) , citizenship remains the key gateway to the (kin-)state, so long as it offers desirable and/or superior rights. Citizenship facilitates participation and sentiments of obligation that quasi-citizenship does not (perhaps deliberately), rendering quasicitizenship a tokenistic gesture advanced by states to maintain symbolic ties, without offering substantial rights and benefits to incentivize engagement.
Citizenship therefore remains a significant and salient political institution as the entryway to the state, by granting a status of equality vis--vis the kin-state and leverage vis--vis the home-state. It will be critical therefore, going forward, to observe the way in which kin-states modify their kinstate practices and, indeed, if they do upgrade policies of quasi-citizenship to full citizenship on the basis of its greater effectiveness in fostering engagement, and hence greater institutional, political and social interaction over and above state borders (Kovcs 2006, 442) .
